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Abstract: In this paper, by employing the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
techniques and Chinese provincial level data from 1991 to 2003, we empirically 
investigate the relationship between finance and growth in post-reform China. We 
find that financial development significantly promotes economic growth in coastal 
regions  but  not  in  inland  regions;  the  weak  finance-growth  nexus  in  inland 
provinces has exacerbated China’s regional disparity. 
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Since 1978, China’s Open Door policy and economic reforms have led to rapid 
economic  development.  However,  while  preferential  government  policy  and  the 
concentration of trade and foreign investment in the coastal areas have significantly 
promoted economic growth in coastal zone, the poor inland regions have been largely 
left behind. Rising regional disparity have posed serious challenges to China’s future 
development.   
In the literature, various factors have been forwarded to explain China’s regional 
disparity.  Tsui  (1991)  examines  the  effect  of  China’s  fiscal  decentralization  on 
regional disparity, and he finds a positive relationship between decentralization and 
worsening regional inequality before 1985. Lee (1994) investigates the relationship 
between foreign direct investment and regional development gaps. He concludes that 
the differences in the amount of FDI inflows contribute to China’s regional disparity. 
Moreover,  many  studies  also  suggest  that  geographical  factors  and  regional 
preferential policies are two important factors that contribute to economic boom in the 
coastal regions (e.g., Fleisher and Chen, 1997; Démurger et al., 2001). In addition, 
there is also evidence that local protectionism may also play an important role in 
explaining China’s regional disparity during the reform era (Young, 2000). 
However, only a  few  works have been made to address the role of financial 
markets in influencing China’s regional disparity. Using Chinese provincial data, this 
paper attempts to examine the finance-growth relationship across Chinese regions. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief 
literature review on the relationship between finance and growth. Section 3 highlights 
recent trend of financial reforms and regional disparity in China. Econometric model 
and method for estimation are described in section 4. Empirical analyses are presented 
in Section 5. Finally, this paper concludes with Section 6. 
2. Financial Development and Economic Growth: a Brief Literature Review 
The important role of financial sector in the process of economic development 
has  long  been  recognized  in  the  literature  (e.g.,  McKinnon,  1973;  Shaw,  1973; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; King and  Levine, 
1993a, 1993b; Merton and Bodie, 1995; Levine, 1997). A well-functioning financial 
system will stimulate economic growth by providing a number of important functions 
such as clearing and settling of payments, pooling of saving, facilitating the allocation 
of  resources  across  space  and  time,  pooling  risk,  and  reducing  information  costs 
(Merton and Bodie, 1995). 
The significant contribution of financial intermediaries in promoting economic 
growth  has  been  highlighted  in  recent  endogenous  growth  literature.  Through 
financial intermediations, financial development can lead to increase in the long run 
growth rate. 
Meanwhile,  a  number  of  new  insights  can  be  drawn  from  recent  advance  in 
theoretical  works.  For  instance,  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990)  develop  an 
endogenous  model,  in  which  finance  and  growth  are  jointly  determined.  They CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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highlight two essential functions of financial intermediaries in promoting growth, i.e. 
collecting  and  analyzing  information  of  alternatives  investment  projects,  and 
increasing  investment  efficiency  through  allocating  the  funds  to  the  projects  with 
higher expected returns. Alternatively, in the endogenous model of Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991), they argue that by enhancing liquidity and mitigating idiosyncratic risk 
through risk diversification and pooling, the development of financial intermediaries 
results  in  reduction  of  households’  unproductive  reserve  of  liquid  assets,  as  such 
funds can be channeled toward illiquid but more productive activities, and therefore 
financial intermediary development highly contributes to economic growth. Moreover, 
the importance of portfolio diversification and risking sharing via stock markets in 
inducing sustained growth is also explored in a number of studies (e.g., Levine, 1991; 
Saint-Paul, 1992). All these works provide strong evidence to suggest that financial 
development  can  affect  long  run  growth  through  different  channels  and  various 
aspects of innovation or productive activities. 
Public policies can also affect financial development in many ways. Roubini and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) are among the few  works that incorporate  government 
behaviors and financial development into endogenous growth model. In their recent 
paper (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995), an AK-type endogenous growth model is set 
up to examine the effects of financial repression policies on long-term growth. They 
argue that government might want to repress the financial sector because this sector is 
an “easy” source for financing the public budget. In order to increase the revenue 
from money creation, governments subject to large income-tax evasion may choose to CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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increase seigniorage by repressing the financial sector and increasing inflation rates. 
Financial repression will therefore be associated with high tax evasion, low growth, 
and high inflation. 
The  positive  relationship  between  finance  and  growth  predicted  by  the 
endogenous growth literature has received considerable support from a number of 
empirical studies. Using data on 80 countries over the period 1960-1989, King and 
Levine  (1993a)  empirically  investigate  the  finance-growth  linkage.  They  find  that 
higher levels of financial development are positively associated with faster current 
and future rates of economic growth, physical capital accumulation, and economic 
efficiency improvement. Based on more recent data for 63 countries over the period 
1960-1995,  Beck  et  al.  (2000)  find  that  higher  levels  of  financial  intermediary 
development produce faster rates of economic growth and total factor productivity 
growth. Similar results can also be found in Levine et al. (2000). Therefore, these 
empirical  studies  suggest  a  positive,  first-order  relationship  between  financial 
development and economic growth.   
However,  this  conventional  view  has  also  been  challenged  by  some  recent 
empirical studies. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) highlight the dangers of statistical 
inference in cross-section studies on finance-growth nexus, in which countries with 
very different experiences in both economic growth and financial development that 
reflect  different  institutional  characteristics  and  different  policies,  are  implicitly 
treated as homogeneous entities. Meanwhile, based on a broad dataset covering 95 
countries, Ram (1999) finds that the predominant pattern indicates a negligible or CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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weakly negative association between financial development and economic growth. In 
addition,  when  the  data  sample  is  split  into  three  subgroups  according  to  growth 
experience  (i.e.,  low-growth,  medium-growth,  and  high-growth  countries),  a  huge 
parametric heterogeneity is observed for the finance-growth relationship. Moreover, 
Andersen and Tarp (2003) also investigate the finance-growth nexus by using the 
identical data of Levine et al. (2000), and estimate with both the full sample and the 
regional sub-samples. They find that while a positive and significant relationship is 
found in the full sample cross-section studies, the correlation is negative in the poorest 
countries; in individual-country studies, different causal patterns between finance and 
growth  are  reported;  meanwhile,  conclusions  are  very  sensitive  to  the  type  of 
estimator used, and slight changes in nuisance parameters often change the results. 
Therefore, empirical findings of existing studies on the finance-growth nexus are 
mixed.  In  this  paper,  with  the  help  of  Chinese  provincial  data,  we  attempt  to 
investigate  the  impacts  of  variation  in  financial  development  on  the  patterns  of 
regional economic growth in China.   
3. Recent Trend of Financial Reforms and Regional Disparity in China 
Since  the  initiative  of  China’s  market-oriented  reforms  in  1978,  substantial 
changes have occurred in China’s financial sector. The abandon of the mono-banking 
system
1  in the late 1970s marked the beginning of China’s financial reforms,
2  and 
                                                        
1:  During  the pre-reform  period,  consistent  with  the  centrally  planned  economy,  a  mono-banking  system  was 
established in China, where the People’s Bank of China (PBC) acted as an all-inclusive financial institution to the 
Chinese economy. 
2:  Four  state-owned  specialized  banks,  authorized  with  specialized  functions  concerning  different  scopes  of 
economic  activities,  were  separated  from  the  People’s  Bank  of  China  (PBC),  and  the  PBC  itself  was  then 
reorganized as the central bank of China in the mid-1980s. These four state-owned specialized banks are: the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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China’s  financial  system  has  been  gradually  transformed  from  a  mono-banking 
system into a diversified financial institutional system. Meanwhile, the past ten years 
have also witnessed rapid development in China’s emerging capital markets. However, 
China’s stock markets, although having experiencing fast growth in the last decade, 
remain relatively small in size and scale when compared to that of the whole banking 
sector. Therefore, China’s financial system is still highly bank-based.   
The promulgation of the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law in 
1995  further  deepened  China’s  financial  reforms.  The  Central  Bank  Law  legally 
confirms the independent status of the PBC; similarly, the Commercial Bank Law 
ensures and protects the independent operations of commercial banks. Therefore, both 
the Commercial Bank Law and the Central Bank Law lay the basis for building a 
modern banking system in China. 
However,  China’s  banking  sector  was  greatly  dominated  by  the  state-owned 
banks,  resulting  in  a  highly  state-monopolized  bank-based  financial  structure. 
Consequently, China’s banking system has become an important instrument for the 
Chinese government to finance its policy-lending targets. Therefore, heavy burdens of 
“policy lending”, poor banking operation and management, soft budget constraints, 
and the lack of efficient regulation and surveillance system, have resulted in large 
scales of non-performing loans in China’s banking sector, which seriously impede the 
further development of financial intermediations. 
                                                                                                                                                               
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Bank of China (BOC), and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). In addition, two other institutions, i.e. the People’s Insurance 
Corporation  of  China  (CPIC)  and  the  China  International  Trust  and  Investment  Corporation  (CITIC),  were 
successively established. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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In order to solve the problems of non-performing loans, the Central government 
injected  a  total  of  270  billion  yuan  (32.6  billion  US  dollars)  into  the  four  major 
state-owned banks in 1998. In addition, four Asset Management Corporations (AMCs) 
were established in 1999 to relieve the four major state-owned banks of heavy burden 
by taking over 1.4 trillion yuan (169 billion US dollars) of non-performing loans and 
bad debts from them.   
With China’s accession into the WTO, further penetration of the foreign banks 
and increasingly intensive competition are expected. Under China’s commitment to 
the WTO, China’s banking sector will be fully open to foreign competition by 2006. 
In  order  to  speed  up  China’s  financial  reform  process  and  to  accelerate  banking 
restructuring,  a  series  of  new  policy  measures  have  recently  been  adopted  and 
implemented to strengthen banks’ corporate governance, to reduce non-performing 
loans, to improve banking performance, and to enhance their competitiveness. 
While  successive  financial  reforms  and  institutional  changes  in  the  financial 
sector  have  strongly  influenced  the  pattern  of  regional  development,  regional 
variation in financial sector development may also play important role in influencing 
the  inland-coastal  income  disparity.  In  fact,  there  exist  significant  differences  in 
capital market development across Chinese regions. With profit rates and returns to 
capital  differing  widely  across  regions,  China’s  capital  markets  are  actually  quite 
fragmented (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2004). Fragmentation 
of  China’s  capital  market  may  arise  mainly  from  direct  and  indirect  government 
control over interest rates and resource allocation (World Bank, 2003). Because of this CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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fragmentation, the development level of local financial intermediaries has been an 
important factor in determining local economic performance (Boyreau-Debray, 2003).   
In the following discussion, we attempt to assess the extent to which financial 
development may affect regional disparity in China. Using Chinese provincial data 
over the period from 1991 to 2003, we empirically investigate the finance-growth 
relationship for China and its regions. 
4. Model and Methodology of Estimation   
4.1 Econometric Model 
In our empirical estimations on the relationship between finance and growth, the 
growth rate of real per capita income (
•
GDPPC ) will be employed as the dependent 
variable. To measure the development level of financial sector, we construct here a 
financial indicator  FDEV , defined as the natural logarithm of real per worker output 
in financial sector. The other explanatory variables include: (1) the growth rate of real 
per capita fixed asset investment (INV); (2) openness (OPEN), defined as the ratio of 
total exports to GDP; (3) education (EDU), measured by the proportion of population 
with junior secondary school and a higher level; (4) non-state sector development 
(NSOE), measured by the ratio of fixed investment in non-state sector to total fixed 
investment. 
In  general,  for  econometric  test,  the  regression  model  can  be  described  as 
follows: 
t i i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i
NSOE EDU OPEN
INV FDEV INITGDPPC GDPPC
, , 6 , 5 , 4
, 3 , 2 1 , 1 ,
ε µ β β β
β β β α
+ + + + +
+ + + = −
•
(1) CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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where  subscripts  i   and  t   index  provinces  and  time  respectively;  INITGDPPC  
denotes  the  natural  logarithm  of  initial  value  of  real  per  capita  income.  Table  1 
presents the definition of variables. Descriptive statistics for all these variables can be 
found  in  Table  2.  In  addition,  the  Generalized  Method  of  Moments  (GMM) 
methodology will be applied to control for possible endogeneity in our econometric 
model. 
[Table 1 here] 
[Table 2 here] 
4.2 Data 
The data to be used cover 29 Chinese provinces over the period of 1991-2003. 
The primary sources of our data are from China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, various 
years), China Population Statistics Yearbook (NBS, various years), Accounting Data 
and Materials on Gross Domestic Product in China: 1952-1995, and Comprehensive 
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of China (NBS, 1999). 
5. Empirical Results 
We first estimate our regression model using data from all provinces, and then 
re-examine  the  model  using  data  from  the  coastal  regions  and  inland  regions 
respectively. Empirical results are presented in Table 3. For each regression, we test 
the specification of equation with the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, and 
then  with  the  Arellano-Bond  test  for  the  second  order  serial  correlation.  The  test 
results show that all the regressions satisfy the specification tests. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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[Table 3 here] 
Consider first the results for all Chinese provinces (see Column 1 of Table 3). 
We  find  that  financial  development  significantly  contributes  to  China’s  economic 
growth. The coefficient of  FDEV   is positive and highly significant at the 5% level, 
indicating that regions with higher level of financial development tend to enjoy faster 
economic growth.   
For  the  case  of  coastal  regions,  we  find  that  the  indicators  of  financial 
development (FDEV) enter positively and significantly into the growth model (see 
Column 2 of Table 3). Empirical results show that financial development significantly 
promotes economic growth in the coastal regions. 
However,  for  the  case  of  inland  regions,  we  find  a  rather  weak  correlation 
between  finance  and  growth  (see  Column  3  of  Table  3).  More  importantly,  the 
coefficient of FDEV is statistically insignificant.   
Therefore, our empirical results suggest that financial development significantly 
promotes economic  growth in coastal regions  but not in inland regions; the weak 
finance-growth  nexus  in  the  less-developed  regions  may  widen  the  coastal-inland 
income gap in China. 
6. Conclusion 
Using Chinese provincial level data from 1991 to 2003, this paper examines the 
relationship between financial sector development and regional economic growth in 
China. Our empirical results show that financial development significantly promotes 
economic  growth  in  coastal  regions  but  not  in  inland  regions;  the  weak CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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finance-growth nexus in inland provinces may aggravate China’s regional disparities. 
These results have important implications for China’s future development: effective 
policy measures have to be forwarded to further strengthen the financial sector in 
inland  regions,  so  as  to  improve  the  capital  allocation  efficiency  and  accelerate 
economic growth in the less-developed areas, and to reduce income disparity among 
Chinese regions.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.32 
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Table 1 Definition of Variables 
 
Variables  Definition 
•
GDPPC  
Growth rate of real per capita income 
FDEV  The Indicator of financial development, defined as the natural 
logarithm of real per worker output in financial sector 
INV  Growth rate of real per capita fixed asset investment 
OPEN  Trade openness, calculated by the ratio of total exports to GDP 
EDU  The indicator of education development, measured by the share 
of population with educational attainment of junior secondary 
school and higher level 
NSOE  The indicator of non-state sector development, calculated by the 
ratio of fixed investment in non-state sector to the total fixed 
investment 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Observation 
•
GDPPC   0.0988  0.0373  -0.033  0.381  377 
FDEV  10.4517  0.6041  8.6900  12.3819  377 
INV  0.1404  0.1465  -0.2201  0.7647  377 
OPEN  0.1407  0.1629  0.0224  1.0165  377 
EDU  0.4638  0.1250  0.1914  0.8091  377 
NSOE  0.4150  0.1465  0.0877  0.7086  377 
•
GDPPC : Growth rate of real per capita income; FDEV, the indicator of financial 
development; INV: growth rate of real per capita fixed asset investment; OPEN: trade 
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Table 3: Financial Development and Economic Growth in China 
(Dependent variable =  t i GDPPC ,
•





Coastal Provinces  Inland Provinces 
1 , − t i INITGDPPC   -0.0376***  -0.0605***  -0.0396 
  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.001) 
t i FDEV .   0.0131**  0.0304***  -0.0001 
  (0.017)  (0.006)  (0.985) 
t i INV ,   0.1445***  0.1638***  0.0695*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
t i OPEN ,   0.0791***  0.0739***  -0.0585 
  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.278) 
t i EDU ,   0.1022***  0.0976  0.1340*** 
  (0.003)  (0.117)  (0.001) 
t i NSOE ,   0.0686**  0.0444  0.0550*** 
  (0.024)  (0.321)  (0.008) 
Constant  0.1412**  0.1609  0.2936*** 
  (0.042)  (0.308)  (0.000) 
       








Arellano-Bond test for the 








Observations  377  143  234 




GDPPC : Growth rate of real per capita income;  INITGDPPC : the natural logarithm of 
initial value of real per capita income; FDEV, the indicator of financial development; INV: 
growth rate of real per capita fixed asset investment; OPEN: trade openness; EDU: the level 
of education development; NSOE: the level of non-state sector development. 
2. ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. 
3. For all regressions, p-values are presented in parentheses. 